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Dreams and the Activity of Mind and/or Body:  
Some Re-evaluations of Anthropological Discourse Around 17501  
 
The dream, a major topic of European thought in the eighteenth century, was 
considered a work of the imagination. Philosophers, anthropologists and physicians 
interested in the function of the imagination used dreams to learn more about the 
fabrication of ideas and their mutual mental and physical influences. This article 
presents three theses:  
 
 
1. I concentrate on the period around 1750 and suggest that more innovative 
results were achieved at this time than recent research has conceded. I thereby 
antedate the presumption that the boom in medical and anthropological 
discussion of dreams was the era around 1800 by asserting that important 
arguments and aspects were already more or less developed in the middle of 
the Eighteenth century. 
 
2. Contrary to the model of dream as a sleep of reason I will demonstrate that on 
the contrary philosophers and anthropologists around 1750 considered dreams 
to be reasonable and comprehensible. 
 
3. Even if we concede the models of negation and of deficiency (i.e. the absence 
of reason, absence of sensation and absence of consciousness) which bestride 
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the ongoing discussion regarding anthropological perspectives of dreams in 
the eighteenth century, I argue that anthropologists around 1750 did not 
disapprove of and reject dreams, rather they were keen to examine their origin, 
consistency and psycho-physical effects. 
 
 
Manfred Engel and Peter-André Alt extensively analysed the theory and literature on 
dreams in the era of European Enlightenment and Romanticism, therefore I will begin 
with a brief introduction to and comment on the main findings of these two scholars.  
In a fundamental article of 1998,2 Engel heuristically distinguishes four discourses on 
dreams: i) a philosophical discourse, ii) a medical-physiological discourse, iii) a 
popular enlightenment discourse, and iv) an anthropological discourse in which he 
seems to be chiefly interested. He describes the first three discourses very briefly. The 
philosophical discourse uses an ontological argument in emphasizing the lack of truth 
in dreams. The medical-physiological discourse explains dreams as an effect of the 
movement of spiritus animales, animal spirits, which re-activate traces of memories 
of past ideas. In the discourse of popular enlightenment, the account of dreams is part 
of a wider critique of superstition. Here, Engel recognizes a shift from the 
accentuation of prophetical dreams to so called ‘natural’ dreams which arise from the 
inner nature of man. With regard to the anthropological discourse Engel finally 
stresses a theory of deficiency, that is the conviction that dreams either lack reason or 
consciousness or even sensual perception. Engel emphasizes that the anthropologists 
mainly analyse the blunders and slips of the dreamer in order to get insight into 
repressed emotions. Engel later discusses examples of dreams in literature from Rich-
ardson and Rousseau to Wieland and Schiller. He mobilises the whole Freudian 
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vocabulary (Freudian slips, defence mechanism of repression, access to the 
unconscious) although he asserts us that his intention is not to reduce the history of 
the Enlightenment theory on dreams to psychoanalytical terms.  
 
Peter-André Alt agrees with Engel’s assumption of the autonomy of literature, which 
he expounds in terms of Niklas Luhmann’s theory of functional differentiation. 
Whereby he suggests that literature can develop more complex ideas about dreams. 
Alt, however, points out that only literature could display the semantics of dreams as 
well as a new conception of individuality.3 By presenting a résumé of philosophical 
theories of dreams in the Enlightenment, Alt constructs a progression from a model of 
negation to a more positive model of mental activity in dreaming. The model of 
negation – very similar to Engel’s theory of deficiency though avoiding all its 
problematic psychoanalytical presuppositions4 – assumes either the absence of reason 
(he mentions Descartes, Malebranche, Wolff, Condillac), the absence of sensation 
(Locke) or the absence of consciousness (Hume). Alt’s narrative incorporates the 
oppositional terms of reason versus unreasonableness, consciousness versus 
unconsciousness, activation of body and soul versus deactivation and consumption of 
‘Lebenssaft’ (lifeblood) referring to Johann August Unzer. In reporting the results of 
psycho-medical research Alt accentuates the one-sided supposition of influxus 
psychicus or mental influence focussing on the theory of Johann George Sulzer. 
 
Both Alt and Engel marginalize the physical aspects of dreaming.5 I agree with Engel 
and Alt that dreams were regarded as psychologically and physiologically influenced, 
that is, not as the product of supernatural or evil powers – as in the tradition of the 
Dream Book of Artemidor, which was influential until the early modern period. I, 
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however, feel it inappropriate to stress the aspect of negation or – in Engel’s term – of 
deficiency in the anthropological models of dreams and dreaming around 1750. Engel 
and Alt downplay a significant positive emphasis in the anthropological texts, which 
on the one hand thoroughly investigate the impact of physical and mental factors on 
dreams as well as the origins of disordered and confused ideas while on the other hand 
neglecting the morally practical perspective on dreams that is given in the didactical 
stories of the Moralischen Wochenschriften (Moral Weeklies) between 1748 and 
1761. 
 
Considering the discussion on dreams around 1750 one can distinguish five 
perspectives: 
 
 
1. With regard to the reproductive power of imagination, dreams are conceived 
of as a continuation of the thoughts and feelings of the preceding days. This 
continuation is presented in terms of order and reason. Dreams can be used to 
enhance individual self-knowledge and they can also be improved through the 
habitualization of ideas. 
 
2. With regard to the productive power of the imagination, dreams are also 
regarded as compensation for unsatisfied or repressed desires that arise in the 
normal course of everyday life.  
 
3. The psychic activity is characterized by the metaphor of the soul as a puppet 
player. 
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4. Empiricist philosophers and contemporary medical scientists also concede that 
dreams may be influenced by bodily factors.  
 
5. The empiricist and sensualist view of dreams increases the value of 
inconsistent and confused ideas through investigation of the structure of 
dreams.  
 
 
1. Dreams as a reasonable continuation of thoughts and feelings of the awake 
mind – ‘Moralische Wochenschriften’ 
Dissenting from Alt’s view, I argue that the German ‘Moralische Wochenschriften’ 
from 1748 to 1761 already give an account of dreams as a source of self-knowledge 
because they are seen to follow a reasonable order. Alt however holds that it was not 
until Diderot’s Le rêve d’Alembert (1769) that dreams were recognized as following a 
reasonable order.6  
 
The Moral Weekly Der Mensch (The Man) dealt with dreams as an object of popular 
philosophy. In volume ten from 1755 we find a very elaborate article on dreaming. 
One paragraph sketches the pragmatic use of dreams:  
 
 
The most reasonable and most striking interpretation of dreams consists in 
regarding dreams as symbols – not as symbols of prospective happy or unhappy 
contingencies but as symbols of our ethos [Gesinnung] and character. Therefore we 
have a duty to use our dreams as a source of self-knowledge.7  
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Furthermore, the article goes on to state that dreams sometimes appear as a ‘clearer 
mirror of the self’. Since we are not distracted from new sensations we “think and act 
absolutely authentically”.8 In these quotations we find a very innovative perspective 
that regards dreams as a reflection of someone’s individual motives for action and 
their state of mind. We could call this the individualisation of dreams, in contrast to 
their traditional interpretation with the help of ‘dream books’, which was based on 
collective, timeless patterns of meaning. The addressing and questioning of dreams in 
order to improve self-knowledge implies that dreams are a continuation of the past or 
recent ideas and emotions of the individual dreamer.  
 
In the same article, another use of dreams is pointed out which is worth keeping in 
mind. The author admonishes the readers to improve their imagination and their 
poetic faculty by dealing with good and morally appropriate things and affairs during 
the day. The following drastic warning reveals the morally pragmatic context of this 
idea: “When a man is thinking bad and sexual things all day long […] and satisfying 
his sexual affects to a certain extent, in dreams he will emerge as a bigger bitch hunter 
or even the landlord of a bordello [my translation].”9 
 
This sentence is meant to repudiate the sexual content of dreams and furthermore to 
encourage the disciplining of dreaming on the basis of a continuous control of the 
imagination while awake. Although one might be reminded of Freud’s theory of the 
Über-Ich, super-ego, which is activated in dreams, this warning is grounded in the 
aesthetic ideas of Georg Friedrich Meier. In his aesthetics of 1748 – which was based 
on a more empiricist interpretation of the Wolffian School of philosophy, he pleads 
for the improvement of the so called lower faculties of the soul like memory, 
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imagination, or attention.10 The imagination is divided into two aspects, a repro-
ductive power on the one side, and a productive power on the other; the productive 
power is also called Dichtungskraft, poetic power. Meier promotes an absolutely 
controlled use of the poetic power based on the principles of sufficient causation and 
consistency. The same control of the imagination should be applied to dreams in 
adapting them to reasonable and moral limits. In this example – and I might add lots 
of others from the ‘Moralische Wochenschriften’ edited by the Wolffian scholars 
Meier and Samuel Gotthold Lange11 – the improvement of self-knowledge means 
self-control based on reason and morality. Therefore I prefer to speak of a model of 
habitualization of dreams, through the habitualizing of the imagination as a 
productive faculty. In the empirical psychology of the late Enlightenment period we 
find a perhaps more radical postulation of the disciplining of dreams, for example in 
the psychic-sanitizing articles of Carl Friedrich Pockels in the Magazin für 
Erfahrungs-Seelenkunde (1783-1793) who suggested the keeping of a diary of the 
imaginary evidents in dreams.12 
 
2. Dreams as a compensation for unsatisfied/repressed desires in the normal 
course of life – ‘Moralische Wochenschriften’  
Although Engel argues that the theory of compensation of unsatisfied desires in 
dreams is first displayed in fictional texts, for example, Wieland’s novel Geschichte 
des Agathon (1766/67) we already find it in the semi-fictional stories of the formerly 
mentioned ‘Moralische Wochenschriften’, but with another emphasis. In these 
writings, dreams were conceived of as not only a clearer mirror of the self, which has 
to be morally controlled. But, compensatory dreams are allowed if they balance a poor 
life, for example, a life without enough food. If someone has only water, bread and 
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poorly prepared vegetables he might imagine an opulent meal without having a 
crammed stomach afterwards.13 In this perspective, satisfaction of repressed desires in 
dreams is acceptable as long as it complies with the ideals of Bourgeois virtue, in this 
case temperance and frugality. Although the inconsistency in this argument is more 
than obvious – it is not applied to sexual desires – it may show that dreams were not 
only conceived of simply as a continuation of daily thoughts and activities but also as 
compensation for unsatisfied desires. This discrepancy perhaps reveals that the 
alleged possibility of habitualization of dreams is an ex-post rationalization while 
adapting dreams to reality, i.e. to the limits of reason and morality. It might be added 
that the abovementioned considerations regarding dreams are limited by the 
boundaries of moral pragmatic discourse. 
 
3. The soul as a puppet player – Johann Gottlob Krüger  
With regard to the continuation model of dreams we can observe that anthropological 
thinkers around 1750, like A. v. Haller or J. G. Krüger, assume that ideas in dreams 
are often consistent and ordered. Krüger states that ideas in dreams may continue the 
array of ideas that the dreamer had before falling asleep, for example solving 
mathematic problems or producing poetic verses in dreams.14 Hence, contrary to the 
model of negation I would emphasize that dreams are also considered integrated parts 
of the entire soul, reasonable and deliberate. For Krüger, the association of ideas in 
dreams, even if it appears disordered in the dream itself, always has a sufficient 
reason.15 For Haller the soul while dreaming is self-consciously drawing conclusions 
and making judgements.16  
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At this point, I have to mention a remarkable metaphor that is used by two different 
anthropological thinkers, by Krüger as well as by Charles Bonnet.17 In dealing with 
the problem of disordered ideas in dreams Krüger discusses the role of the soul. He 
says:  
 
 
In dreams the soul resembles a puppet player who moves his puppets. In doing so 
the soul does not know what it is doing while imagining itself as a spectator of a 
performance, which itself produces. But it would be good if the reason for this 
terrible error were detected, the error by which the soul considers its own creatures 
as alien products.18  
 
 
This quotation directs our attention to the pitfalls faced by the soul which is called on 
to be aware of everything it causes despite being incapable of so doing. Although we 
might attribute this assumption to the model of negation or absence it nevertheless 
opens a perspective onto a model of the soul that regards it as the creator of the ideas, 
which seem unconscious although they have a psychic origin. This assumption of 
Krüger’s may lead us to a more positive model of mental activity in dreams which Alt 
ascribes to the influence of Johann George Sulzer’s essay on Consiousness and its 
Influence on Our Judgement19 assuming that this scholar was the originator of this 
positive view on dreams.20 
Shifting the point of view to the empiricist anthropological theories regarding dreams 
of around 1750 I will now concentrate on the different explanations of disordered 
ideas in dreams. In using the term ‘disordered ideas’ I may appear to confirm the 
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model of negation and deficiency, however, I would suggest that the concession of 
disordered, confused ideas in dreams has been associated with a special attention, 
fascination, and detailed inquiry regarding the fabrication of ideas in terms of their 
bodily as well as their psychological aspects. But one should not blame the 
anthropologists (in the way Alt criticises them21) for their eagerness to analyse what 
they in fact reject in accepting the consequence of disenchantment regarding dreams. 
In conceding that ideas in dreams can be confused or irregular, anthropological 
orientated scholars exculpate them from the alternative of the true or untrue while 
emphasizing the proper order of ideas.  
 
4. The physically influenced causation of dreams – A. v. Haller and J. G. Krüger  
Although most of the anthropological thinkers considered dreams as a consequence of 
preceding sensations – Engel considers them as the model of the “Tagesrest” (remains 
of the day) – they also describe the effects of spontaneous sensations while dreaming. 
This contradicts the opinion that the dreamer’s sensations are also asleep.  
 
Anthropologists pay much attention to the point of bodily caused sensations. In his 
Physiology of 1757 onwards, Albrecht von Haller sets out that dreams may be caused 
by hunger and thirst, fever and pains or by constrained blood circulation.22 
Furthermore, he asserts, in agreement with Tissot, that the ejaculation of seminal fluid 
can cause erotic dreams.23 The same example is cited by the psychic-medical thinker 
Ernst Anton Nicolai who denounces the phenomenon as a consequence of too many 
sexual contacts.24 Besides this moral objection it is a striking idea that dreams may 
arise spontaneously and involuntary through physically influenced causation.  
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That thinkers like Haller, Krüger, and Meier, along with philosophers like Johann 
Heinrich Samuel Formey or Charles Bonnet make the body responsible for the 
characteristic confusion in dreams would seem to affirm the model of negation. We 
should remember Goya’s bonmot: “the sleep of reason gives birth to monsters”. Apart 
from this kind of demonisation however, we also find a rather detailed examination of 
bodily influences. In analysing dreams philosophers and medical scientists alike speak 
about conflicting orders of ideas, for example, when the dreamer had developed an 
array of ideas following the sensation of heat which contradicts a new array of ideas 
arising from the sensation of cold after their blanket drops from the bed. These kinds 
of dreams are conceived of as composed dreams.25 The investigation of physical 
causation indicates that they may not only cause confused dreams or nightmares but 
also positive emotions. This explanation gives some insight into the connexion 
between the mind and body. 
 
5. Re-evaluation of inconsistent dreams – David Hartley  
At the centre of the writings on memory and imagination by empiricist philosophers is 
the theory of association, which deals with the order of ideas. David Hume stated 
three principles of association: resemblance, contiguity and causality. David Hartley, 
one of the main representatives of Associationism in eighteenth century, formulated a 
fresh, innovative perspective on dreams. Hartley was particularly interested in their 
disorder and inconsistency. In his Observations on Man of 1749, he outlines three 
psychophysical mechanisms that influence dreams: “First, The Impressions and Ideas 
lately received, and particularly those of the preceding Day. Secondly, The State of 
the Body, particularly of the Stomach and Brain. And, thirdly, Association.”26 
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Dealing with the problem of disorder, Hartley points out that the dreamer is 
indifferent to order or disorder because of the vividness of ideas in dreams: “The 
Scenes which present themselves are taken to be real. We do not consider them as the 
Work of the Fancy; but suppose ourselves present, and actually seeing and hearing 
what passes.”27 Hartley moves on stating that inconsistency and wildness are con-
sequences of the vivid and quick rise of ideas in dreams. For example, dreamers might 
experience the impression of being in two places at one time or of seeing one person 
simultaneously in different places.  
 
Hartley also considers different stages of dreaming: 
 
 
The Dreams which are represented in the first Part of the Night are, for the most 
part, much more confused, irregular, and difficult to be remembered, than those 
which we dream towards the Morning; and these last are often rational to a 
considerable Degree, and regulated according to the usual Course of our 
Association.28 
 
 
In describing the process of dreaming Hartley deploys the psychic-medical theory of 
vibrations, which is based in the Stahlian medical tradition.29 Mind and nerves are 
active during the whole night. Dreams are triggered either by nearly imperceptible 
vibrations in the nerves or through the transfer of ideas in the brain.30 If someone 
dreams, for example, the same pictures over and over again Hartley explains this 
physiologically as the “return of the same state of the brain”.31 Hence, we forget 
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dreams quickly “because the state of the brain suffers great changes in passing from 
sleep to vigilance”.32 Therefore, Hartley considers keeping the body in the same 
position after awakening might increase the chances of remembering a dream. 
Although we can find conflicting arguments in the empiricist and sensualistic 
tradition, for instance Condillac’s quite critical statement on the failure of reason in 
dreams,33 Hartley gives dreams more validity while assuming that the dreamer is not 
able to differentiate the vivid, disordered ideas in dreams from real, reasonably 
ordered sensations. It is also worth emphasizing that in the period around 1750 there 
is a detailed investigation of origin and connexion of ideas in dreams and the 
possibility of their recollection. 
 
To sum up, with regard to the above five points, the significance of anthropological 
thought concerning dreams as a part of human nature around 1750 is underestimated 
and deserves to be re-evaluated with regard to particular aspects. Anthropological 
writers of this period already regard dreams as a key to individual self-knowledge. 
They give practical advice on how to improve dreams through habitualizing the 
imagination while being awake. This can be seen as an extension of the grasp of 
rationality to the so-called ‘dark regions’ of the souls. They re-evaluate positively the 
‘unconscious’ parts of the soul. They regard dreams as having the potential to 
compensate for unsatisfied desires if these are compatible with the ideals of Bourgeois 
virtue. From an empiricist perspective, the anthropologists investigate physical 
influences on emotions, and last but not least, they give a detailed examination of the 
origin, consistency and psycho-physical effects of dreams. This conference paper may 
provide the impulse for a more thorough investigation of these insights. 
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